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ERRING ON THE SIDE OF JUSTICE:
A CALL FOR AN END TO PROSECUTORIAL
ARROGANCE IN OPPOSING DNA TESTING
FOR EVIDENCE UNTESTED AT TRIAL -
LESSONS OF INNOCENCE AND HUMILITY
FROM THE CASE OF DEAN CAGE
STEVEN W. BECKER*
INTRODUCTION
In November 1994, Dean Cage was arrested for the aggra-
vated criminal sexual assault of L.Z. There was no physical evi-
dence linking Cage to the crime despite the fact that L.Z.
testified at trial that the rapist repeatedly sexually assaulted her
in a variety of ways. The only evidence introduced against Cage
was the victim's eyewitness identification. Yet, although Cage
presented an alibi witness and testified on his own behalf that he
was at home with his girlfriend at the time of the crime, he was
convicted at a bench trial and sentenced to 40 years in prison.
* Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender,
First District, Chicago, Illinois; Adjunct Professor, DePaul University Col-
lege of Law, Chicago, Illinois; Senior Fellow, International Human Rights
Law Institute, DePaul University College of Law; Co-R~dacteur en Chef,
Revue Internationale de Droit P~nal (France).
The author represented Dean Cage on appeal seeking a reversal of the trial
court's denial of Cage's motion for DNA testing. See People v. Cage, No. 1-
02-2898 (1st Dist. Mar. 26, 2004) (Rule 23 Order) (affirming denial of DNA
motion on the ground that there was no basis to conclude that the victim's
clothing contained genetic material for testing).The views expressed in this
article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
organizations with which he is affiliated.
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After Cage's direct and post-conviction appeals were ex-
hausted, he filed a motion for DNA testing pursuant to section
116-3 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure ("the Code").
A judge other than the trial judge denied Cage's motion on the
ground that there was a stipulation at trial that the swabs taken
from L.Z. tested negative for spermatozoa, thus concluding that
there was nothing to test. On appeal from the denial of the
DNA motion, appellate counsel discovered that several items of
L.Z.'s clothing had never been tested and could contain genetic
material suitable for testing. Given the potential that testing
these items could have toward demonstrating Cage's innocence,
appellate counsel requested that the State not oppose Cage's re-
quest for DNA testing. The State, however, vigorously fought
the case on appeal, and, in March 2004, the appellate court af-
firmed the trial court's denial of the motion.
Thereafter, Cage contacted the Innocence Project in New
York. Subsequent DNA testing of L.Z.'s clothing and the swabs
positively excluded Cage as the rapist. Cage was exonerated
and released from prison on May 27, 2008, after being incarcer-
ated for almost 14 years for a crime he did not commit. What is
equally troubling, however, is that had the State not opposed
Cage's request for DNA testing on appeal, Cage could have
been released years earlier. It is this latter travesty of, justice
that the present article seeks to confront.
Part I of this article addresses Illinois's DNA statute at the
time of Cage's motion and provides an overview of Illinois Su-
preme Court jurisprudence interpreting the statute. Part II gives
a detailed factual description of Cage's odyssey through the Illi-
nois court system, concluding with his recent exoneration. Part
III focuses on the many lessons to be learned from Cage's case,
including the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, the impor-
tance of allowing the post-trial testing of items previously unt-
ested at trial, the significance of recent revisions to Illinois'
DNA statute, the ethical duty of prosecutors to see that justice is
done, the compensatory hurdles faced by those victimized by
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wrongful convictions and the exceptional virtue of humility ex-
hibited by Cage in the face of this personal tragedy.
I. ILLINOIS'S DNA STATUTE
On July 23, 1997, Illinois became only the second state in the
nation to "allow a person convicted of a crime to obtain DNA or
fingerprint testing on evidence gathered at the time of trial, if
such testing had not then been available and the results might
prove the person's innocence."1 Four months later, a dozen in-
dividuals had been exonerated.2 As of May 2008, a total of 29
people in Illinois, Cage being the most recent, had been cleared
of criminal wrongdoing through DNA evidence. 3
At the time of Cage's motion in 2002, Illinois' DNA statute,
which is contained in section 116-3 of the Code, provided, as it
had since its inception, as follows:
Motion for fingerprint or forensic testing not
available at trial regarding actual innocence.
(a) A defendant may make a motion before the
trial court that entered the judgment of conviction
in his or her case for the performance of finger-
print or forensic DNA testing on evidence that
was secured in relation to the trial which resulted
in his or her conviction, but which was not subject
to the testing which is now requested because the
technology for the testing was not available at the
time of trial. Reasonable notice of the motion
shall be served upon the State.
1 Gregory W. O'Reilly, A Second Chance for Justice: Illinois' Post-trial Fo-
rensic Testing Law, 81 JUDICATURE 114, 114 (1997).
2 Kathryn E. Carso, Comment, Amending the Illinois Postconviction Statute
to Include Ballistics Testing, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 695, 721 (2006).
3 Maurice Possley, DNA Exonerates Inmate on Rape Conviction After 14
Years, CHI. TRIB., May 27, 2008, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/local/chi-dna-exonerates-prisoner-webmay28,0,5734277.story.
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(b) The defendant must present a prima facie
case that:
(1) identity was the issue in the trial which re-
sulted in his or her conviction; and
(2) the evidence to be tested has been subject
to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it
has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced,
or altered in any material aspect.
(c) The trial court shall allow the testing under
reasonable conditions designed to protect the
State's interests in the integrity of the evidence
and the testing process upon a determination that:
(1) the result of the testing has the scientific po-
tential to produce new, noncumulative evidence
materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of
actual innocence;
(2) the testing requested employs a scientific
method generally accepted within the relevant sci-
entific community. 4
The Illinois Supreme Court has addressed the scope of the
DNA statute on multiple occasions. For example, in People v.
Savory,5 the Court construed the meaning of the phrase "mate-
rially relevant" in subsection (c)(1)'s requirements that "the re-
sult of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new,
noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant's
assertion of actual innocence."6 The question faced by the
Court was whether testing is permitted only where a favorable
result will completely vindicate a defendant or whether it is per-
mitted where the result will merely significantly advance an as-
sertion of innocence. 7 The Court concluded that "evidence
4 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-3 (2002).
5 1756 N.E.2d 804 (I11. App. Ct. 2001).
6 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-3(c)(1) (2002) (emphasis added).
7 Savory, 756 N.E.2d at 810-11.
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which is 'materially relevant' to a defendant's claim of actual
innocence is simply evidence which tends to significantly ad-
vance that claim."8 Said another way, it is not necessary that the
testing lead to a complete exoneration. 9 The Court ruled, how-
ever, that such an assessment "cannot be determined in the ab-
stract" and necessitates a review of the trial evidence, as well as
consideration of the evidence the defendant seeks to test.10 In
Savory, after reviewing the evidence at trial, the Court con-
cluded that a favorable outcome would not materially advance
the defendant's assertion of innocence.11
In People v. Johnson,12 the Illinois Supreme Court decided the
question of whether the petitioner presented a prima facie case
where he sought testing of a previously untested item.13 More
specifically, in Johnson, the petitioner filed an amended post-
conviction petition seeking, inter alia, DNA testing of a Vitullo
rape kit pertaining to the victim, contending that the results
would raise doubts as to whether he committed the rape and,
ultimately, whether he was responsible for the murder of a sec-
ond individual. 14 The petitioner asserted that the swab in the kit
had never been tested. 15 Additionally, he contended that iden-
tity was the principal matter of dispute at trial because the sole
proof introduced against him was the rape victim's identification
testimony.16
Initially, the Court clarified that a request for DNA testing
may be made in a post-conviction petition, which is an appropri-
ate vehicle by which to assert claims of actual innocence. 17 The
8 Id.
9 Id. at 811.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 811-12.
12 793 N.E.2d 591 (11. App. Ct. 2002).
13 Id. at 599.
14 Id. at 596, 598.
15 Id. at 598.
16 Id.
17 Id.
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Court also clarified that to present a prima facie case for DNA
testing, a "defendant must show that identity was the central is-
sue at trial and that the evidence to be tested was subject to a
sufficiently secure chain of custody."'18 With respect to the latter
requirement, the Court noted that, "[o]n the record before us
... we cannot discern the condition of the Vitullo kit.. ",19 The
Court further rejected the State's claim that the petitioner failed
to meet this element because he did not present evidence of the
kit's current location, reasoning that "such evidence would not
be available to the defendant" and remarking that the kit
"would have remained in the custody of the circuit court clerk
after the defendant's conviction."20
As to Johnson's particular case, the Court pointed out that, at
the trial court level, the State did not oppose DNA testing but
claimed that there was no evidence to test.21 The State's forfei-
ture aside, the Illinois Supreme Court highlighted that, in John-
son's case, "evidence about the source of genetic material in the
Vitullo kit was never presented at trial."22 That is, the defen-
dant's request was not merely for the purpose of impeaching the
prosecution's evidence; "[i]nstead, he [sought] to present, for
the first time, evidence about the genetic identity of Payne's as-
sailant."23 Significantly, the Court explained that it was unaware
of whether any testable material was present.24 The Court then
declared that "[i]f the available DNA evidence is capable of sup-
porting such a determination by significantly advancing a claim
of actual innocence, there is no valid justification to withhold
such relief if requested on post-conviction review."25 Accord-
18 Id. at 599.
19 Id. at 598.
20 Id. at 600.
21 Id. at 599.
22 Id. at 601.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 598.
25 Id. at 601 (quoting People v. Dunn, 713 N.E.2d 568, 572 (Il. App. Ct.
1999)) (emphasis added).
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ingly, the Court held that the trial court erred in refusing to al-
low DNA testing of the Vitullo rape kit.26
In People v. Shum,27 just as in Johnson, the petitioner raised a
request for DNA testing of a Vitullo rape kit in an amended
post-conviction petition;28 the only direct evidence at trial
against the petitioner was the eyewitness identification testi-
mony of one of the victims, and the State indicated that it did
not oppose testing.29 Moreover, DNA testing was unavailable in
1984 when petitioner's trial was held. 30 The trial court had
granted the State's motion to dismiss the petition on the ground
that it was speculative as to whether DNA testing would pro-
duce evidence of actual innocence, especially in light of the fact
that, in the trial court's view, identity was not at issue in the case
because the eyewitness who positively identified the petitioner
had been previously acquainted with him.31 The Illinois Su-
preme Court, however, rejected this narrow construction of the
issue of identity, holding that because the only evidence
presented was the identification testimony of a single witness in
a case involving a single assailant and the petitioner had consist-
ently denied any involvement in the crimes, the petitioner had
established a prima facie case in demonstrating that identity was
a central issue in the case.32 Accordingly, following Johnson, the
Court ruled that the trial court erred in denying the petitioner's
request for DNA testing.33
Next, in People v. Brooks,34 the Illinois Supreme Court con-
strued subsection (a)'s requirement that the evidence "was not
subject to the testing which is now requested because the tech-
26 Id.
27 797 N.E.2d 609 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
28 Id. at 612, 614.
29 Id. at 620, 621.
30 Id. at 619.
31 Id. at 619-20.
32 Id. at 620-21.
33 Id. at 621.
34 851 N.E.2d 59 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
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nology for the testing was not available at the time of trial."35
Therein, the defendant filed a section 116-3 motion requesting
polymerase chain reaction DNA testing ("PCR DNA test-
ing").36 In affirming the trial court's denial of the motion, the
Illinois Supreme Court noted that, at the time of the defendant's
trial in 2000, PCR DNA testing was an available testing method
and was recognized nationwide.37 Accordingly, the Court held
that the defendant was unable to demonstrate that the re-
quested testing method was unavailable at the time of trial.38
Most recently, in People v. O'Connell, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that, based upon an interpretation of the plain lan-
guage of the statute, "a defendant who pleads guilty may not use
section 116-3 as a means to request DNA testing." 39
In 2003, Illinois's DNA statute was amended to allow for com-
parison analysis with evidence collected by criminal justice
agencies4 ° and to clarify, in harmony with the Illinois Supreme
Court's holding in Savory, that testing must be allowed "even
though the results may not completely exonerate the defen-
dant."4' The recent 2007 amendments to the statute, which will
hopefully aid in remedying the vital defects contained in the
original DNA provision, are detailed below.42
35 Id.; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-3(a) (2002).
36 Brooks, 851 N.E.2d at 62. For an explanatory description of this tech-
nique, see Charles M. Strom, Genetic Justice: A Lawyer's Guide to the Science
of DNA Testing, 87 ILL. B.J. 18, 23-24 (1999).
37 Brooks, 851 N.E.2d at 65.
38 Id.
39 People v. O'Connell, 879 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Il1. 2007).
40 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-3(a) (2004).
41 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-3(c)(1) (2004).
42 See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
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H. THE CASE OF DEAN CAGE
A. Trial
Dean Cage was charged by indictment with, inter alia, the ag-
gravated criminal sexual assault of L.Z.43 At the bench trial
before Judge Bolan, L.Z. testified that on November 14, 1994,
while walking down the street, she was hit in the eye, dragged to
a porch behind an apartment building, taken down some stairs,
and then sexually assaulted. L.Z. stated that she was wearing a
school shirt, sweater and jacket on the upper portion of her
body. On the lower portion of her body she was wearing a uni-
form skirt, which she described as a culotte, a pair of boxers and
a pair of underwear. L.Z. testified that, during the attack, the
assailant pulled down her uniform but nothing else and inserted
his penis into her anus. Then, the assailant instructed her to get
on her hands and knees, and he again inserted his penis into her
anus. Next, the assailant told L.Z. to get on her back, after
which he performed cunnilingus. Following this act, the assailant
repeatedly inserted his penis into and removed it from L.Z.'s
vagina. After that, the assailant kicked dirt around L.Z. and told
her to rub it all over her body. The assailant then fled.
L.Z. testified that, after the assailant ran away, she gathered
her uniform, book and book bag. She said that her uniform was
on the stairs. When asked how her uniform came to be on the
stairs, L.Z. said that she did not know. L.Z. then ran out on the
street, and an individual at a newspaper stand called for assis-
tance. L.Z. had not yet put her clothes back on at the time the
police arrived. After the police took L.Z. back to the scene of
the assault, they took her to the hospital. At the hospital, the
police collected L.Z.'s uniform, sweater, shorts, bra and school
shirt. All these clothing items were included in the trial court's
impounding order.
43 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from the appellate pleadings.
Volume 2, Number 2Spring 2OO.9
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Based on L.Z.'s description of the assailant, a computer-gen-
erated composite sketch was produced and circulated through-
out the neighborhood in which the assault occurred.44
Approximately one week later, the police received an anony-
mous tip that the perpetrator may have worked at a local meat-
packing house.45 On November 19, 1994, the police took L.Z. to
Cage's place of employment where she identified him as her as-
sailant. At the police station, L.Z. identified Cage in a lineup,46
and she also identified Cage by voice.47 Similarly, at trial, L.Z.
identified Cage as her attacker. Both Cage and his girlfriend,
Jewel Mitchell, testified that, at the time of the assault, Cage was
at home with Ms. Mitchell.
At trial, a stipulation was entered into between the parties
that the vaginal, anal and oral swabs taken from L.Z. on No-
vember 14, 1994, did not reveal any spermatozoa. There was no
indication in the stipulation that L.Z.'s clothing was tested for
the presence of spermatozoa. There was no scientific evidence
linking Cage to the assault. During closing arguments, the State
noted that it was unknown whether the assailant ejaculated be-
cause L.Z. did not observe that portion of the assailant's body.
The trial court found Cage guilty of, inter alia, three counts of
aggravated criminal sexual assault. Cage was sentenced to a to-
tal of 40 years in prison. Cage's conviction and sentence were
affirmed on direct appeal. Subsequently, Cage filed a post-con-
44 Possley, supra note 3.
45 Bluhm Legal Clinic, Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, Erroneous ID Sent
Dean Cage to Prison for 14 Years [hereinafter Erroneous ID], http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/ilCageSummary.html.
(last visited June 7, 2009).
46 Id.
47 Angela Rozas, Ex-inmate Reflects on Prison: Man Cleared by DNA in
1994 Rape Spent 14 Years Incarcerated, CHI. TRIB., May 29, 2008, § 2, at 2;
Innocence Project, Press Release, Dean Cage, Wrongfully Convicted Based
on Eyewitness ID Practices that Are Still in Place Today, Is Exonerated in
Chicago with DNA, May 28, 2008 [hereinafter Wrongfully Convicted], availa-
ble at http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/1377.php.
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viction petition, which was denied. The trial court's dismissal
was affirmed on appeal.
B. DNA Motion
In June 2002, Cage filed a pro se "Motion for DNA Testing
Not Available at Trial" pursuant to section 116-3. In his motion,
he alleged that the "[i]dentity of the perpetrator was a key issue
in the trial" and that the materials collected from which DNA
samples could be obtained are "in the possession of the proper
authorities and ha[ve] not been tampered with, replaced, or al-
tered in any material aspect." Cage further alleged that the
DNA testing he sought was unavailable at the time of his trial.
Cage also stated that "[n]one of the material collected was sub-
jected to the test requested." In addition, Cage asserted that
such test results were relevant to an assertion of actual
innocence.
On August 16, 2002, Judge Crane denied Cage's motion be-
cause "[a] review of the file indicates that there was a stipulation
in the case that the oral, vaginal and rectal swabs were negative
for spermatozoa, therefore, there's no substance to test." Cage
filed a timely appeal. On appeal, Cage contended that the trial
court erred in denying his motion for DNA testing where: (1)
identity was the central issue in his case; (2) a sufficient chain of
custody was established; and (3) articles of the complainant's
clothing, which had the potential to produce new, noncumula-
tive evidence material to his claim of actual innocence, were
never tested at trial.48 With respect to the subject of identity,
Cage noted that because the only evidence against him was the
15-year-old complainant's testimony, and because he had raised
an alibi defense and had consistently denied involvement in the
crime, identity of the assailant was the central issue in the case. 49
48 People v. Cage, No. 1-02-2898, Opening Brief, at 8-18 (filed June 17, 2003)
[hereinafter Opening Brief].
49 Id. at 10.
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Cage also asserted that the chain of custody requirement was
met because the items of clothing which he sought on appeal to
have tested, L.Z.'s school uniform, sweater, shorts, bra and
school shirt, were the subject of an impounding order in the trial
court.50
Next, Cage argued that DNA testing would potentially pro-
duce new, noncumulative evidence that was materially relevant
to his claim of actual innocence. First, he pointed out that there
was no scientific evidence linking him to the crime and that, ac-
cording to the trial stipulation, the vaginal, anal and oral swabs
taken from L.Z. did not reveal any spermatozoa. 51 In addition,
based upon L.Z.'s testimony that the assailant engaged in rapid
thrusting activity near the end of the sexual assault, Cage as-
serted that it was very likely that the assailant ejaculated.5 2 Be-
cause there was no evidence that the assailant did not ejaculate,
Cage contended that it was possible that seminal fluid might
have been deposited on L.Z.'s clothing, considering her physical
positioning during the assault and the location of her uniform
and/or shorts, which were presumably lying on the ground.53
Moreover, because it appeared from the trial testimony that the
assailant may have moved some of L.Z.'s clothing to a nearby
stairwell during the assault, Cage argued that he may have trans-
ferred semen from his hands onto the clothing. 54
Furthermore, citing to the then-newly decided case of People
v. Johnson55 in the Illinois Supreme Court,56 Cage vigorously
contended that testing on the clothing items should be allowed
as a matter of course because, just as with the Vitullo rape kit at
issue in Johnson, they were never tested prior to trial. 57 In so
50 Id. at 10-12.
51 Id. at 13.
52 Id. at 13-14.
53 Id. at 14.
54 Id.
55 793 N.E.2d 591 (2002).
56 See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
57 Opening Brief, supra note 48, at 15-16.
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doing, Cage relied specifically on Johnson's exclamation that,
where DNA evidence may exist, "there is no valid justification
to withhold such relief. . .. "58 Cage subsequently noted that the
Court in Johnson granted relief despite the fact that there was
no evidence that the Vitullo kit at issue contained any testable
genetic material, a situation directly analogous to Cage's case
vis-d-vis the complainant's clothing.59
Finally, Cage claimed that, with regard to the statutory man-
date that a defendant must allege that the DNA testing method
sought was unavailable at the time of trial, he satisfied such re-
quirement despite the fact that he did not enumerate to which
particular DNA technology he was referring, which he con-
tended he was not required to identify until the hearing stage on
the motion.6°
In response, the State argued that "[a] rape kit and victim's
clothing do not have the same potential to produce genetic evi-
dence, and since the victim was tested for the presence of sper-
matozoa and it was negative, there is no potential for new
evidence to be found from the [clothing]."61 The State further
asserted that "the record is devoid of any evidence that defen-
dant ejaculated." 62 Thus, the State concluded that Cage's re-
quest for testing L.Z.'s clothing did not have the scientific
potential to produce new evidence materially relevant to Cage's
claim of actual innocence.63 In addition, the State contended
that "defendant's unsupported general claim in his motion for
DNA testing that the technology was unavailable when he was
58 Johnson, 793 N.E.2d at 601 (quoting People v. Dunn, 713 N.E.2d 568, 572
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999)).
59 People v. Cage, No. 1-02-2898, Reply Brief, at 4-5 (filed June 17, 2003).
60 Opening Brief, supra note 48, at 16-17.
61 People v. Cage, No. 1-02-2898, State's Response Brief, at 15 (filed Aug. 5,
2003).
62 Id.
63 Id.
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tried is tantamount to failing to properly plead the prior unavail-
ability of the testing. ' 64
In a terse, nine-page unpublished decision, the Illinois Appel-
late Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Cage's DNA mo-
tion.65 From the very outset, the court seemed to reject the
validity of Cage's appeal because, with respect to the statutory
requirement that the testing method requested must have been
unavailable at the time of trial, "[Cage] did not indicate any spe-
cific type of DNA testing sought or provide any evidence as to
when such testing first became available." 66 Nevertheless, as-
suming for the sake of argument that the testing was unavailable
at the time of trial, the appellate court turned to the merits of
Cage's appeal. 67
The court did find that Cage presented a prima facie case for
DNA testing under the statute, as identity was the key issue at
trial and the clothing items that Cage sought to test were listed
in an impounding order.68 Yet, the appellate court opined that
the record "disclose[d] no basis for concluding that the clothing
defendant seeks to test is 'materially relevant' to his claim of
actual innocence." 69 The basis for the court's ruling was encap-
sulated in the following passage:
The parties stipulated that the oral, vaginal and
rectal swabs taken from the victim tested negative
for spermatozoa. Thus, there is no indication that
her assailant ejaculated or reason to believe that
the victim's clothing contains any samples which
have the potential to produce genetic evidence for
DNA testing, much less to produce new noncumu-
64 Id. at 16.
65 People v. Cage, No. 1-02-2898, Order at 9 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 26, 2004)
(Rule 23 Order) (Campbell, P.J., with O'Brien & Reid, JJ., concurring).
66 Id. at 5.
67 Id. at 6.
68 Id. at 6-7.
69 Id. at 7.
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lative evidence to advance defendant's claim of ac-
tual innocence.70
Accordingly, the reviewing panel affirmed the trial court's
judgment."'
C. Exoneration
In 2004, Cage wrote to the New York-based Innocence Pro-
ject, which began to investigate his case. 72 In late 2006, the In-
nocence Project secured the agreement of the Cook County
State's Attorney's Office to conduct DNA testing.73 Although
initial DNA tests were not conclusive, subsequent testing com-
pletely eliminated Cage as the assailant.74 More specifically,
DNA testing on L.Z.'s clothing and the rape kit produced the
samples that excluded Cage as the perpetrator. 75
On May 27, 2008, Chief Criminal Court Judge Paul Biebel va-
cated Cage's conviction and dismissed all charges against him. 76
III. LESSONS To BE LEARNED
A. Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification
Cage's case provides just one further example of the inherent
unreliability of eyewitness identification, especially in a case in
70 Id. at 8.
71 Id. at 9.
72 Possley, supra note 3.
73 Wrongfully Convicted, supra note 47.
74 Possley, supra note 3.
75 Erroneous ID, supra note 45 (noting that the Innocence Project sought
DNA testing "of saliva recovered from the victim's body and clothing"). Ac-
cording to Alba Morales, an attorney with the Innocence Project who
worked extensively on Cage's case, the testable genetic material on L.Z.'s
clothing was located on her shirt.
76 Possley, supra note 3; Innocence Project, Press Release, DNA Testing
Proves Chicago Man's Innocence in 1994 Rape (May 27, 2008), available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/1377PRINT.php.
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which such identification constitutes the sole evidence against a
defendant. According to the Innocence Project, "[e]yewitness
misidentification is the single greatest cause of wrongful convic-
tions nationwide, playing a role in more than 75% of convictions
overturned through DNA testing." 77 The United States Supreme
Court itself emphasized that "[t]he vagaries of eyewitness iden-
tification are well-known" and confirmed that "the annals of
criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification." 78
Moreover, the reliability of identifications in criminal cases "is
highly contested in both legal and psychological circles." 79 Be-
cause of the numerous variables, both natural and procedural,
that may affect or otherwise adversely influence the accuracy of
an identification, there is a growing trend for courts to permit
defendants to present expert testimony to juries on the subject
of the reliability, or lack thereof, of eyewitness identification tes-
timony.80 As Cage's case demonstrates, not only should this
trend continue, but it might be advisable to extend it to bench
trials as well.
B. Testing Previously Untested Evidence
Of all the lessons to be learned from Dean Cage's case, prob-
ably the most important is that, in the future, there should be no
opposition by the State to post-trial requests by defendants for
77 Innocence Project, Eyewitness Misidentification, http://www.innocence
project.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Oct. 1,
2008).
78 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
79 Rudolph Koch, Note, Process v. Outcome: The Proper Role of Corrobora-
tive Evidence in Due Process Analysis of Eyewitness Identification Testimony,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2003).
80 See, e.g., United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 140-44 (3d Cir. 2006)
(reversing convictions due to district court's refusal to allow expert testimony
concerning the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence and remand-
ing case for new trial). In Illinois, see Justice Wolfson's thoughtful opinion in
People v. Allen, 875 N.E.2d 1221, 1229-33 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), appeal denied,
882 N.E.2d 78 (2008).
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DNA testing of items previously untested at trial where actual
innocence is asserted. This is especially so in a case like Cage's,
where there was no physical evidence whatsoever linking Cage
to the sexual assault of L.Z. and where the only evidence against
him was the victim's eyewitness identification. Cage's case
clearly demonstrates that just because a certain piece of evi-
dence initially tested by the State - in this case the Vitullo rape
kit - fails to disclose testable genetic material, it in no way pre-
cludes the possibility that the testing of other items, such as
L.Z.'s clothing, may contain testable material and may be out-
come determinative on the question of actual innocence.
For example, in a case surprisingly similar in many details to
Cage's, a stain later discovered on the complainant's clothing
proved to be dispositive in freeing a suspect falsely accused of
rape in DuPage County, Illinois.81 The case involved a man who
was identified as the attacker two months after an alleged rape
took place when the complainant saw him in a restaurant.82 He,
like Cage, had an alibi; in fact, the man was not even in Illinois
at the time of the incident but was conducting business in Michi-
gan.83 The complainant and witnesses described the assailant as
a young man in his 20s, weighing approximately 180 pounds,
with curly blond hair and blue eyes. 84 The man charged in the
rape, however, was in his 40s, weighed 250 pounds, had green
eyes, and was balding with sparse dark hair.85 An initial test of
the complainant's underwear tested negative for semen; how-
ever, testing from semen stains on her shorts "indicated that it
could have come from 45 percent of the male Caucasian popula-
tion," which included the defendant. 86
81 See Andrew Martin, Lab Clears DuPage Rape Suspect: Charges Dropped 2
Years After Arrest In Girl's Assault, CHI. TRIB., June 18, 1994, § 1, at 1.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
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Close to two years after the defendant's arrest, during prepa-
ration for trial, another forensic scientist scrutinized the State's
evidence and concluded that additional tests on the underwear
could be conducted.87 In fact, it was discovered that the state
crime lab failed to notice a semen stain on the victim's under-
wear.8 8 When the stain was tested, the results completely ex-
cluded the defendant from being the assailant.89 The next day,
the charges against the defendant were dropped.90 Serious
questions remain as to whether any further inquiry would have
even been conducted into the physical evidence in the case had
the media not begun to publicly question the obvious discrep-
ancy between the initial description of the assailant and that of
the charged suspect.91 In any event, the state crime lab's failure
to identify the semen stain on the girl's underwear kept the sus-
pect "under a wrongful accusation of rape for nearly two
years,"9 2 left him penniless and destroyed his international con-
sulting business. 93
In the aforementioned case, the defendant was at least spared
the trauma of being incarcerated after being wrongfully con-
victed of rape. Yet, where an imprisoned defendant claiming ac-
tual innocence seeks to have previously untested evidence
tested, there is no legitimate justification for the State to chal-
lenge such a request. As a matter of fact, in both of the Illinois
Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson and Shum, the items
sought to be tested had not previously been subjected to DNA
87 Id.
88 Andrew Martin & Thomas Hardy, Rape Suspect's Nightmare Lab Kept
Wrong Man Jailed, CHi. TRIB., June 22, 1994, § 1.
89 Martin, supra note 81, at 5.
90 Id. For further information on the case and the resulting civil suit, see
Tangwall v. Stuckey, 135 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 1998).
91 See, e.g., Eric Zorn, Battling for Justice is Dicey in DuPage, CHI. TRIB.,
June 7, 1994, §1.
92 Martin & Hardy, supra note 88.
93 Zorn, supra note 91.
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testing, and the Court granted relief.94 For the State to oppose
testing of untested items in such circumstances deprecates the
quest for justice in favor of the subservient goals of efficiency
and finality.
C. Recent Revision to Illinois's DNA Statute
Effective October 23, 2007, Illinois's DNA statute was
amended by Public Act 95-688 to allow for the filing of a motion
requesting the testing of evidence that "was not subject to the
testing which is now requested at the time of trial," rather than
solely because the technology for such testing was not available
at the time of trial.95 This is a significant revision that will un-
doubtedly have a salutary effect on preventing the type of injus-
tice evident in the appellate court's decision in Cage's case,
where a defendant is effectively precluded from obtaining relief
in the form of DNA testing for evidence previously untested at
trial simply because the technology for testing may have been
previously available.
Public Act 95-688 resulted from Senate Bill 1023, which, in
turn, incorporated changes made to House Bill 1290, the latter
of which was originally introduced to permit the filing of a mo-
tion for the performance of Integrated Ballistic Identification
System testing.96 One can best see the evolution of the change
resulting in the new DNA statute by viewing House Amend-
ment Number 1 to House Bill 1290, which altered in the follow-
ing manner the latter portion of subsection (a) of the DNA
statute that would allow the filing of a motion for DNA testing
where the evidence:
94 See People v. Johnson, 793 N.E.2d 591, 598, 601 (Il1. 2002); People v.
Shum, 797 N.E.2d 609, 619, 621 (Ill. 2003).
95 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-3(a)(1), (2) (2008).
96 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, July 12, 2007, at 3-4 (statement
of Rep. Turner) ("Amendment #1 encompass[es] what was . . . House Bill
1290. And in House Bill 1290 we dealt with ballistic testings and DNA and
the ability to use that evidence in future cases.").
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(1) but whieh was not subject to the testing which
is now requested beause the technolgy for the
testing was not availa at the time of trial; or.
Reasonable notice of the motion shall be servedl
upon-the-State.
(2) although previously subjected to testing, can be
subjected to additional testing utilizing a method
that was not scientifically available at the time of
trial that provides a reasonable likelihood of more
probative results. Reasonable notice of the motion
shall be served on the State.97
The legislature describes these revisions as providing that the
defendant may make a motion for performance of Integrated
Ballistic Identification System or forensic DNA testing on evi-
dence: (1) that was not the subject of testing which is now re-
quested at the time of trial (rather than because the technology
for the testing was not available at the time of trial) or (2) al-
though previously subjected to testing, can be subjected to addi-
tional testing utilizing a method that was not scientifically
available at the time of trial that provides a reasonable likeli-
hood of more probative results. 98
As such, subsection (a) of the new DNA Statute now reads, in
toto:
(a) A defendant may make a motion before the
trial court that entered the judgment of conviction
in his or her case for the performance of finger-
print, Integrated Ballistic Identification System, or
97 Amendment No. 1 to House Bill 1290, Judiciary II - Criminal Law Com-
mittee, 95th Gen. Assem., Mar. 22, 2007, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/full
text.asp?DocName=09500HB1290.hamOOl&GA=95&SessionId=51&Doc
Typeld=HB&LegID=30055&DocNum=1290&GAID=9&Session=.
98 Senate Bill 1023, Bill Status, 95th Gen. Assem., available at http://www.
ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus-pf.asp?DocNum=1023&GAID=9&DocTypelD
=SB&LegId=29086&SessionlD=51&GA=95 (describing Senate Floor
Amendment No. 1).
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forensic DNA testing, including comparison analy-
sis of genetic marker groupings of the evidence
collected by criminal justice agencies pursuant to
the alleged offense, to those of the defendant, to
those of other forensic evidence, and to those
maintained under subsection (f) of Section 5-4-3
of the Unified Code of Corrections, on evidence
that was secured in relation to the trial which re-
sulted in his or her conviction, and
(1) was not subject to the testing which is now re-
quested at the time of trial; or
(2) although previously subjected to testing, can
be subjected to additional testing utilizing a
method that was not scientifically available at the
time of trial that provides a reasonable likelihood
of more probative results. Reasonable notice of
the motion shall be served on the State. 99
In sum, although the new amendment correctly retains the
option of obtaining additional testing of evidence where an ad-
vanced methodology was unavailable at the time of initial test-
ing, it eliminates the draconian requirement that post-trial
testing can only be granted where the technology was not availa-
ble at the time of trial. Thus, the inclusion of new subsection
(a)(1) solves two deficiencies in the former version of the stat-
ute. First, it eliminates the requirement for defendants, most
likely pro se inmates with no legal or scientific background, to
have to identify a previously unavailable DNA testing method -
a task that most lawyers would find daunting, to say the least.100
Secondly, it provides for the testing of items previously untested
at trial. Although there are not currently any reported decisions
interpreting this new provision, the revision seems to signal an
99 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-3(a) (2008).
100 Strom, supra note 36, at 18 ("Lawyers must learn the historical context of
DNA testing, the chronology of testing methods, and the implications of re-
cent advances in DNA technology.").
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important advance in streamlining the procedure for defendants
seeking DNA testing in pursuit of a claim of actual innocence.
D. Prosecutorial Duty to Seek Justice
Rule 3.8(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct pro-
vides that "[t]he duty of a public prosecutor or other govern-
ment lawyer is to seek justice, not merely to convict."101 Long
ago, the Illinois Supreme Court declared that "[t]he State's at-
torney in his official capacity is the representative of all the peo-
ple, including the defendant, and it [is] as much his duty to
safeguard the constitutional rights of the defendant as those of
any other citizen. ' 102
What happened, however, to this duty to seek justice in
Cage's case? The State knew that there was no physical evi-
dence linking Cage to the crime. It knew that, in addition to his
own testimony, Cage had an alibi witness and that L.Z.'s cloth-
ing had never been tested for DNA material. In addition, be-
cause of the very real probability that such testing could
demonstrate that Cage was actually innocent, Cage's appellate
counsel formally requested that the State not oppose Cage's mo-
tion under these unique circumstances.103 Yet, the State's in-
transigence, coupled with the appellate court's unjustified
adherence thereto, cost Cage years of freedom.
Was it just easier for the State to oppose Cage's request for
DNA testing on appeal than to face the possibility that it had
convicted the wrong man? Was it more cost effective to keep
Cage locked up for the remainder of his sentence than to con-
duct a new investigation in an effort to find the real assailant?
Was it more important for the Criminal Appeals Division of the
Cook County State's Attorney's Office to maintain its numerical
tally of affirmances than to risk letting a potentially innocent
Volume 2, Number 2
101 ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2007).
102 People v. Cochran, 145 N.E. 207, 214 (1924).
103 Opening Brief, supra note 48, at 17.
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man go free? Was the Chief of the Criminal Appeals Division,
who was appointed as an associate judge in Cook County the
year following the appellate court's decision in Cage's case,10 4
more concerned with her personal political ambitions than with
the rudiments of justice? Or was it just a case of institutional
arrogance, by which the prosecutor's office persistently refuses
to admit that it is ever wrong, no matter how egregious the
error?
Such systemic arrogance is clearly evident in the recurring
problem of prosecutorial misconduct in Illinois, which the Illi-
nois Supreme Court has consistently decried.105 Another egre-
gious example of this "win at all costs" attitude was callously
exhibited in a recent, high-profile case in New York involving a
mother who was wrongfully convicted and incarcerated for
more than a decade for allegedly killing her own 13-year-old
daughter.10 6 In that case, after DNA evidence was found that
matched the real killer, the District Attorney tried to save face
by suggesting that the daughter, who was brutally strangled and
whose naked body was found lying on her bed, may have been
having consensual sex with the murderer, and later, after the
mother was released by the court, made a public announcement
that the young victim had actually died of a cocaine overdose. 107
104 See SULLIVAN'S JUDICIAL PROFILES: THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL DIRECTORY
306 (2008) (containing biographical information on Renee Goldfarb, former
Chief of the Criminal Appeals Division, whose name appears as the supervis-
ing attorney on the State's appellate brief in Cage's case).
105 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 803 N.E.2d 405, 423-25 (Ill. 2003) (reversing
the convictions of three defendants where prosecutors made improper re-
marks during closing argument); People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920, 940-42 (Ill.
2000) (granting a new trial due to the State's improper suggestions to the jury
and the introduction of a bloodied police uniform and editorialized
objections).
106 Keith Morrison, A Common Thread, June 9, 2008 (transcript from NBC
television broadcast June 8, 2008), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/
25047818/print/l/displaymode/1098/.
107 Id.
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One can only hope that these cases will serve in the future as
vivid reminders to prosecutors to err on the side of seeking
justice.
E. Compensation for the Wrongly Imprisoned
Illinois law provides for compensation for those wrongfully
incarcerated. In fact, a newly revised statutory amendment that
just came into effect in September 2008 provides for monetary
compensation based upon the time period spent in prison, "for
time unjustly served in prisons of this State when the person
imprisoned received a pardon from the governor stating that
such pardon is issued on the ground of innocence of the crime
for which he or she was imprisoned or he or she received a cer-
tificate of innocence from the Circuit Court . "..."108
Upon his release, Cage had "no money or material posses-
sions."109 Hopefully, Governor Pat Quinn will act quickly to par-
don Cage and thereby demonstrate some of the same courage
heroically exhibited by former Governor George H. Ryan in his
historic condemnation of the deplorable state of the criminal
justice system in Illinois,110 which has led to substantial
reforms."'
F. The Virtue of Humility
On the day that Dean Cage was finally to be released from
prison after spending almost 14 years behind bars for a crime he
did not commit, he remarked, "But my mother said everything
happens for a reason, that it happened to put me closer to the
108 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/8 (2008).
109 Sophia Tareen, DNA Exonerates Chicago Man; Spent 12 Years in Prison
on Rape Conviction, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 29, 2008, at 24.
110 See Address of Governor George Ryan at DePaul University College of
Law, at 12 (Jan. 10, 2003) (transcript on file with author).
111 See COMMISSION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVER-
NOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002).
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Father, to make me a stronger person." 112 It is a truism that we
grow more in adversity than in times of calm and pleasure, our
character must reveal its true nature under the crucible of test-
ing and resistance. Cage also stated that he was not embittered
by his experiences, having nourished his faith through reading
the Bible while in prison. 113 Cage credited his endurance of the
past decade and a half to "his faith in God and the perseverance
of his family and attorneys."'1 4 Finally, after spending those
many years unjustly convicted and imprisoned, Cage simply con-
cluded, "There's a God up there. He blessed me. I couldn't have
done this without him." 115 Such a remarkable revelation after
such a personal tragedy is reminiscent of the lesson of Christ,
who, in addressing a group of lawyers, proclaimed, "For whoso-
ever exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that humbleth him-
self shall be exalted."" 6
Prosecutors across the country could learn an invaluable les-
son from Dean Cage. One could argue that the virtue of
humility is an essential quality in seeking justice. As human be-
ings, we ought to place ourselves in another's shoes and consider
how we would like to be treated if we were in the position of the
other person. It is hoped that prosecutors will begin to nurture
this virtue, as without it their lives will be irretrievably con-
sumed in the intoxicating power of the State.
112 Possley, supra note 3.
113 Tareen, supra note 109, at 24.
114 Rozas, supra note 47, at 2.
115 Id. at 3.
116 Luke 14:11 (King James).
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